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 The Black Lives Matter protests, and the broader Movement for Black Lives they 
inspired, came to rapid prominence in no small part because their signature cause — police 
shootings of unarmed or unthreatening Black Americans — is perversely telegenic and (for most 
Americans) jarring. The grainy web videos depicting confrontations between police and Black 
citizens, nearly always ending with a Black citizen crumpled over, brought attention to a 
phenomenon that had previously received sporadic attention outside Black communities. 
 However, other causes advocated by the Movement are more familiar and (at least in the 
context of American judicial and legal history) prosaic. For instance, the Movement’s platform 
calls for the abolition of capital punishment on the grounds that the death penalty in the U.S. is a 
“racist practice” that “devalues Black lives” (Movement for Black Lives 2017).1 In so doing, the 
Movement refers to a body of empirical studies (dating back to the 1940’s; Myrdal 1944) 
suggesting racial discrimination in the administration of the death penalty in the United States. 
More specifically, these studies indicate both that Black American capital defendants are more 
likely to be subject to execution than defendants of other races and that those who murder Black 
Americans are less likely to be subject to execution than are those who murder members of other 
races. The question of whether such apparent discrimination legally impugns the death penalty 
                                                 
1 We first explored philosophical questions based on the Movement’s claims about the death penalty in Cholbi and 
Madva (2018). See also Cholbi (2006). 
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has a long legal history in the U.S., and in general, while the courts have occasionally expressed 
worries about such discrimination, jurists have taken such evidence to warrant reform of capital 
punishment practices but not its outright abolition. In calling for abolition, the Movement thus 
invites us to see the death penalty as one among many fronts in a “war against Black people” and 
“Black communities” in the United States (Movement for Black Lives 2017). 
 Our purpose here is to defend the Movement’s call for death penalty abolition on grounds 
that (we expect) those sympathetic to the Movement’s diagnosis of the current state of racial 
justice in the United State will find congenial. We do so first by providing a sketch of recent 
American judiciary history surrounding race and capital punishment, a sketch that reveals how 
the forms of bias essential for understanding how racial discrimination in the American capital 
punishment regime occurs do not fit within the picture of racial bias advanced by the courts. The 
racial discrimination at issue, we argue, flows in significant part from implicit biases concerning 
race, criminality, and violence. That implicit biases play such a role explains both why recent 
capital sentencing reforms have been largely unsuccessful in diminishing such discrimination 
and why further procedural reforms aimed at reducing such discrimination should also be met 
with skepticism. We then turn to the case for abolition as a response to this persistent 
discrimination. Defenders of capital punishment have not fully appreciated that such 
discrimination grounds a complaint on the part not only of those Black Americans who interact 
with the criminal justice system as capital defendants or as murder victims, but also on the part 
of Black Americans as a class who have not been accorded equal status under the law. The 
magnitude of this latter complaint, we argue, along with the intractability of this discrimination 
make abolition a compelling remedy. The time for abolition of the death penalty has therefore 
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arrived, as it is the most efficacious and most just response to the realities surrounding race and 




 In 1972, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the death sentences of three Black American 
men, William Furman, Lucius Jackson, and Elmer Branch. In each case, the applicable state laws 
did not provide juries with unambiguous criteria by which to determine whether a defendant 
should be sentenced to die. In a 5-4 vote, the Court ruled in the appellants’ favor, their per 
curium opinion holding that the state statutes under which the defendants were convicted were 
unconstitutional, and so the “carrying out of the death penalty in these cases constitute cruel and 
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments” (Furman 1972: p, 
240). This language is puzzling on its face. The Eighth Amendment seems to impose a 
substantive limitation on the kinds of punishment to which criminals may be subject, to wit, that 
those punishments not be cruel or unusual. The post-Reconstruction Fourteenth Amendment, in 
contrast, is concerned with legal equality, demanding that states not deny citizens the equal 
protection of their laws. How then could a death sentence in these cases violate both such 
Amendments by virtue of being “cruel and unusual”? There was little unanimity in the rationales 
provided by the concurring justices. (The decision itself reached an astonishing 80,000 words in 
total.) Justices Brennan and Marshall advanced recognizably Eighth Amendment arguments, 
                                                 
2 In claiming that capital punishment practice in the U.S. have failed to accord Black Americans equal legal status, 
we acknowledge that a range of other practices (such as extra-judicial lynchings, police brutality, drug laws 
imposing harsher sentences for substances used to a greater degree in Black communities, etc.) have contributed to 
the denigration of Black Americans’ equal status as well. See James (2000) and Muhammad (2010). 
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asserting that death was by its nature cruel and unusual, a sanction at odds with “human dignity” 
(Furman, 1972,  p., 291) and “shocking” to the “conscience and sense of justice” of the average 
citizen (Furman, 1972, p.  365). (One dissenting justice, Blackmun, expressed similar 
sentiments: “I yield to no one in the depth of my distaste, antipathy, and, indeed, abhorrence, for 
the death penalty, with all its aspects of physical distress and fear and of moral judgment 
exercised by finite minds” (Furman, 1972, p.  405).) 
 What, then, of the defendants’ Fourteenth Amendment complaint? Their attorneys had 
offered evidence that non-White defendants received the death penalty more often than Whites. 
Such statutes thus seemed to permit racial discrimination to influence capital sentencing, such 
that Black Americans did not have the same legal protection or status as other defendants. 
Several of the justices accepted such empirical findings, and were clearly unnerved by the 
prospect that capital punishment gave “room for the play of such prejudices” against “the poor 
and the despised,” as Douglas put it (Furman, 1972, p. 255). Strangely, though, it was not 
concerns about racial bias that primarily moved the justices. Rather, the justices emphasized that 
the capital punishment statutes then in existence resulted in “unusual” punishments because they 
provided judges and juries too much discretion in deciding which defendants are sentenced to 
die. Douglas decried the “uncontrolled discretion of judges or judges” in 
the determination whether defendants committing these crimes should die or be imprisoned. Under these 
laws, no standards govern the selection of the penalty. People live or die, dependent on the whim of one 
man or of 12. (Furman, 1972, p. 253) 
Justice Stewart denied that racial discrimination had been proven in these cases, but nonetheless 
concluded that death was “wantonly” and “freakishly imposed,” with no more rhyme or reason 
than lightning strikes (Furman, 1972, p. 310). Justice White similarly complained that “there is 
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no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it [death] is imposed from the 
many cases in which it is not” (Furman, 1972, p. 313). 
 Thus, despite the race-based arguments advanced by the defendants, and despite the 
justices’ evident dismay at the apparent racial disproportionality in capital sentencing, racial 
discrimination turned out to play a rather marginal role in the justices’ reasoning. Their central 
concern was instead that the laws gave decision makers too much latitude in deciding who to 
sentence to die and so provided no rational basis for the allocation of the most severe punishment 
utilized in our legal system. This emphasis on the “freakish” or “arbitrary” imposition of the 
death penalty governed subsequent efforts at reforms. The Furman ruling resulted in a four-year 
moratorium on the death penalty in the U.S., during which time states crafted new capital 
punishment statutes and sentencing guidelines. New state statutes and sentencing guidelines 
required that both aggravating and mitigating factors be taken into account in capital sentencing; 
capital trials be bifurcated into guilt and penalty phases; capital cases be subject to automatic 
appeal; and states conduct proportionality reviews, in which a state appellate court considers 
whether a given capital sentence aligns with, or is instead disproportionate to, other sentences 
issued in the state’s capital cases. In a series of cases beginning with Gregg vs. Georgia (1976; 
Cholbi and Madva 2018, n.8), the Supreme Court concluded that such state statutes satisfied the 
procedural criteria put forth in Furman: that capital sentencing be guided by objective criteria but 
still responsive to judge and jury determinations of particular defendants’ record, character, and 
capital crime (i.e., the death penalty could not be automatically imposed on those convicted of a 
particular class of crimes). American capital punishment jurisprudence thus entered a period of 
“guided discretion,” wherein the death penalty was permissible so long as the discretion 
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exercised by judges or juries was (as the Furman ruling mandated) “suitably directed and limited 
so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.” 
 Neither the new state sentencing guidelines nor the language of “guided discretion” 
explicitly mentioned racial discrimination. Yet given the concerns about racial discrimination 
expressed by the justices in Furman, one might expect the Court to be sympathetic to defendants 
claiming that their own death sentences were shaped by racial biases that, for whatever reason, 
the post-Furman reforms were not able to identify or mitigate. McCleskey v. Kemp (1987) tested 
this hypothesis. Warren McCleskey, a Black American man, was convicted of the murder of 
White Atlanta police officer Frank Schlatt. The jury sentenced him to die because of two 
aggravating circumstances: that the murder occurred during the commission of an armed robbery 
and his victim was a police officer engaged in performing his official duties. As in Furman, 
McCleskey’s attorneys invoked the Fourteenth Amendment requirement of equal protection and 
cited studies indicating “racially disproportionate impact” in the imposition of capital 
punishment in Georgia. The most prominent of these studies was conducted by David Baldus, 
whose examination of 2,500 murder cases in Georgia found that those convicted of killing a 
White victim were 4.3 times as likely to receive the death penalty than those whose victims were 
from other racial groups (Baldus, Pulaski, and Woodworth 1983). The Court ruled against 
McCleskey. An equal protection finding, the Court concluded, required more than evidence of 
“racially disproportionate impact,” for sentencing disparities of the sort highlighted in Baldus’ 
study are “an inevitable part of our criminal justice system.” McCleskey had instead to “prove” 
either that “the decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose” or that the state 
legislature had “enacted or maintained the death penalty statute because of an anticipated racially 
discriminatory effect.” McCleskey lacked such evidence. He was executed in 1991. 
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 As a number of critics of the McCleskey decision observed, the ruling sets a nearly 
impossible bar for claims of unconstitutional racial discrimination in sentencing. Societal 
opposition to overt racism, as well as the fact that many law enforcement or judicial decisions 
that could be influenced by race are not open to public scrutiny, makes it almost certain that 
“smoking gun” evidence of overt or intentional racial discrimination on the part of lawmakers, 
prosecutors, or law enforcement officials will not be uncovered. As Michelle Alexander, author 
of The New Jim Crow, has concluded: 
McCleskey v. Kemp has immunized the criminal justice system from judicial scrutiny for racial bias. It has 
made it virtually impossible to challenge any aspect, criminal justice process, for racial bias in the absence 
of proof of intentional discrimination, conscious, deliberate bias ... Evidence of conscious intentional bias is 
almost impossible to come by in the absence of some kind of admission. (Alexander 2010) 
Given the standard set by McCleskey, it is not surprising that capital defendants have had 
virtually no success in advancing claims of racial discrimination subsequently (aside from claims 
relating to the selection of jurors on the basis of race (see Batson 1986, Miller-El 2005, and 
Snyder 2008). This is so despite the mounting evidence that patterns of racial discrimination of 
the sort found in Baldus’ study continue to this day. Since 2000, empirical studies of nine states 
have found that Black American defendants are more likely to face a death penalty prosecution 
or to be sentenced to death than defendants of other races, while empirical studies of 14 states 
and the armed forces have found an even stronger effect on capital sentencing based on victims’ 
race, concluding that those who kill White people are more likely to be sentenced to die than 
those who kill members of other racial and ethnic groups (see Cholbi and Madva 2018, notes 10, 
11). These two effects also appear to interact, so that cases like McCleskey’s “involving black 
defendants and white victims are treated more punitively than cases with all other 




Can a case be made for the Movement for Black Lives’ call for abolition on the basis of such 
evidence, even in the absence of proof that lawmakers, law enforcement officials, juries, etc. 
purposefully or intentionally discriminate against Black American defendants or victims in the 
capital punishment process? There is, we contend, conceptual space between purposeful 
discrimination and mere randomness or unpredictability, a space occupied by implicit bias. 
Before mapping this space, we stress that our claim is not that implicit bias alone explains the 
racial injustices of capital punishment. Implicit bias is just one factor among many. For example, 
some evidence suggests that due to tax cuts, local police departments have been increasingly 
pressured to devote greater resources to (i.e., overpolice) revenue-generating practices such as 
asset seizures and fines in Black American communities, which has forced them to devote fewer 
resources to (i.e., underpolice) preventing and solving violent crimes in those same communities 
(Goldstein, Sances, and You 2018). Such structural considerations are incredibly important. And 
we of course do not rule out the potential role of explicit bias in the devaluing and dehumanizing 
of Black lives (implicit and explicit forms of racial bias are, we believe, complexly intertwined; 
Madva 2019). Consider a recent study examining mock jurors’ reactions to a case inspired by the 
shooting of Keith Scott in Charlotte in 2016 (Cooley, Lei, Brown-Iannuzzi, and Ellerkamp 
2018). Researchers found that jurors’ explicit racial prejudices negatively correlated with their 
willingness to attribute responsibility and guilt to an officer who fatally shot a Black (but not 
White) victim. Researchers also found that racial bias led jurors to perceive that the officer was 
in a “dangerous” or “threatening” situation when the victim was Black (but not White), and to 
deny that the officer’s own racial biases could have been a factor in his decision-making.  
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In what follows, however, we focus on implicit bias because, as we try to show, it poses 
unique constraints on which remedies will feasibly address the racial injustices at issue. 
Cases like McCleskey unfolded at a time when overt endorsements of racial animosity were 
in decline yet broader patterns of racial discrimination persisted. Cleary, racism had not just 
vanished. Social psychologists thus began to develop a number of tools for detecting bias in 
contexts where individuals were either unable or unwilling to admit that they endorsed 
problematic racial stereotypes. Several decades on, it is clear that most Americans, including 
many African Americans, carry these implicit racial biases.3 Some of the most pernicious biases 
directly pertain to criminal justice, and an expanding body of research speaks to the specific role 
these biases play—consciously or unconsciously—in the perceptions, emotions, and decisions of 
eyewitnesses, police, prosecutors, judges, and juries (Nosek et al. 2007; Behrman and Davey 
2001; Correll, Hudson, Guillermo, and Ma 2014; Glaser 2014; Ogletree, Smith, and Wald 2012; 
Smith and Cohen 2012; Spence, Charbonneau, and Glaser 2016). Moreover, while these biases 
surely exacerbate discrimination throughout the criminal justice system, they appear especially 
salient in capital sentencing contexts (Hunt 2015; Lynch and Haney 2011).  
For example, Whites tend to be less sensitive to the pain experienced by Black people, which 
suggests that Black defendants, and the families of Black victims, can expect that prosecutors, 
judges, and juries will be less moved by their capacity to suffer (Trawalter, Hoffman, and Waytz 
2016). In this vein, a field study found that jurors were less likely to report that the love, grief, 
and loss experienced by a victim’s family played an important role in their decision-making 
when victims were Black than when White (Karp and Warshaw 2006). This insensitivity to 
                                                 
3 For a review of “meaningful life outcomes” predicted by implicit attitudes, see Blair, Dasgupta, and Glaser (2015). 
For discussion of implicit bias measures in light of recent empirical criticisms, see Brownstein, Madva, and 
Gawronski (2019) and Brownstein, Madva, and Gawronski (Forthcoming). 
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Black suffering is in turn likely explained by the tendencies to see Black people in some contexts 
as subhuman and primitive (Goff, Eberhardt, Williams, and Jackson 2008), and in other contexts 
as physically “superhuman” (Levinson 2007).  
This dual tendency, toward the dehumanization and “superhumanization” of Black bodies, 
also helps to explain why Black people are likely to be perceived as more threatening and less 
amenable to rehabilitation. When defendants are Black, mock jurors are more likely to falsely 
remember “aggressive” details of a crime (Levinson 2007), and more likely to think that the 
conviction remains appropriate despite the use of inadmissible evidence (Hodson, Hooper, 
Dovidio, and Gaertner 2005; Johnson, Whitestone, Jackson, and Gatto 1995).4 Some studies tie 
these discriminatory patterns directly to implicit biases, some of which pose general problems for 
criminal justice, such as the automatic association of Black faces with words like “guilty” 
(Levinson, Cai, and Young 2010; Levinson and Young 2010), while others introduce specific 
problems for capital decision-making, such as the automatic association of Black people with 
words like “expendable” and “worthless” (Levinson, Smith, and Young 2014). This latter 
association was found to be especially prominent among mock jurors who were willing to 
convict regardless of a potential death sentence, and even predicted these individuals’ decisions 
to sentence a Black defendant to death rather than life in prison.5 The implicit devaluation of 
                                                 
4  In fact, participants in Johnson Whitestone, Jackson, and Gatto (1995) falsely believed that they were less 
influenced by the inadmissible evidence when defendants were Black. For further studies on juror bias, see Cohn, 
Bucolo, Pride, and Sommers, 2009; Young, Levinson, and Sinnett, 2014. 
5 Researchers also found that the refusal to sentence someone to death led to the exclusion of non-White jurors, and 
that the death qualification process therefore exacerbated the impact of racial bias on capital sentencing. Notably, 
their participant sample was drawn from six of the most active death penalty states: Alabama, Arizona, California, 
Florida, Oklahoma, Texas. Moreover, “those who are more likely to be allowed to serve on death penalty cases are 
not only more likely to harbor racially prejudiced attitudes, but also are more likely to favor the conviction of 
innocent defendants over letting guilty ones go free.” (Young 2004); cf. Peffley and Hurwitz, 2002.  
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Black defendants and victims in capital contexts may also illuminate why, when victims are 
White, defendants who look more stereotypically Black are also more likely to receive a death 
sentence (Eberhardt, Davies, Purdie-Vaughns, and Johnson 2006). 
In fact, one study (Glaser, Martin, and Kahn 2015) found that Black and White defendants 
were equally likely to be convicted (67.7% and 66.7% respectively) by mock jurors when life 
without parole was the maximum possible sentence, yet, when a death sentence was possible, 
conviction rates for White defendants fell (55.1%) even as conviction rates for Black Americans 
rose (80%). In other words, the sheer possibility of capital punishment may be a self-igniting 
engine of discrimination, over and above the more familiar influences of racial bias on decisions 
in other spheres. That capital punishment affords unique opportunities for bias to manifest is 
further supported by the finding that White support for the death penalty increases after White 
people learn about racial disparities in capital sentencing (Peffley and Hurwitz, 2007; cf. Hetey 
and Eberhardt, 2014). 
We hypothesize that all the aforementioned implicit racial stereotypes and prejudices—the 
tacit devaluation of Black life, the insensitivity to Black pain and loss, and the impulses to see 
Black people as either superhuman threats or subhuman beings—make crimes committed by 
Black defendants (or against White victims) appear particularly heinous.  
This research also makes it clear why existing reforms have largely failed to reduce racial 
discrimination in capital sentencing, and why the prospects for future reforms short of abolition 
are similarly grim. Take, for example, Matthew Kramer’s recent proposal (2011, p. 245) that the 
death penalty be applied only in the most extreme, “defilingly evil” cases. Ordinarily, racial bias 
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is indeed more likely to tip the scales in more ambiguous cases,6 which at first glance suggests 
that reserving the death penalty for the most morally unambiguous cases could bypass bias. But 
the evidence we just reviewed suggests that the ordinary rules do not apply in capital contexts: 
implicit biases make the murders committed by African Americans seem unambiguously grave, 
while the crimes committed against them seem decidedly less so. As a result, implementing 
proposals like Kramer’s could well result in a disproportionate number of murders by Black 
Americans or murders of non-Black Americans to be classified as “defilingly evil” and so 
eligible for the death penalty. 
Even if judges and jurors could somehow evade the influence of racial bias, and consistently 
recommended a death sentence only in extreme cases, this would still fail to address the insidious 
operations of bias prior to sentencing. Consider two examples. First, bias may affect the 
resources that detectives and prosecutors devote to gathering evidence, such that the evidence 
comes to seem more damning when victims are White. One study in Louisiana thus found that 
prosecutor case files were significantly thicker when victims were White women, and thinnest 
when victims were Black, which in turn correlated with severer sentences for those convicted of 
killing White people and women (Pierce, Radelet, Posick, and Lyman 2014). Implicit bias can, 
therefore, play a role in disambiguating cases. Second, consider the role of bias in voir dire. 
While most potential jurors explicitly report being unbiased, one study found that professional 
attorneys were nevertheless able to pick up on potential jurors’ unstated racial biases, and keep 
or remove them from the pool partly on this basis (Morrison, DeVaul-Fetters, and Gawronski 
2016). These decisions can, however, invariably be rationalized by appeal to ostensibly non-
                                                 
6 For example, mock jurors’ implicit biases lead them to interpret ambiguous evidence as more damning when the 
defendant is dark-skinned than when light-skinned. See Levinson, Cai, and Young (2010) and Levinson and Young  
(2010).   
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racial reasons (Sommers and Norton 2007). The operations of bias in this context are likely to 
persist unless attorneys are denied the right to strike jurors altogether. Both of these examples 
thus reveal the special challenges posed by implicit bias insofar as it is especially resilient in the 
face of attempted reforms, such as more precise sentencing guidelines or the requirement to 
consider both aggravating and mitigating factors. One of the most effective strategies for 
reducing the effects of bias is anonymization, the concealment of markers of racial identity 
during key decision-making moments. But anonymization is clearly not a viable option in these 
settings.7 Nor should we be optimistic that bias could be circumvented with seemingly more 
objective standards for use of the death penalty, such as having murdered multiple persons or 
mandatory use of the death penalty for all first-degree murders.8 Such standards would still leave 
many opportunities for racial bias to influence who is convicted of murder, such as in the 
evidence gathering and charging stages of the criminal justice process. 
Post-conviction procedures such as mandatory appeals of all capital sentences have also been 
introduced as checks against arbitrariness in capital decisions. While such procedures may in 
principle be capable of reducing the total number of unjust death sentences, they may 
simultaneously introduce additional ways for racial bias to shape outcomes, insofar as sentence 
relief becomes more likely for White than Black defendants (Petrie and Coverdill 2010).  
We believe that it is therefore established to a high degree of probability that structural 
unfairness pervades the criminal justice system such that Black Americans are discriminated 
against in cases in which capital punishment is a possible outcome, and that this discrimination is 
                                                 
7 Though anonymization can be utilized in determining whether to charge individuals with crimes at all. See 
Williams (2019) for discussion of San Francisco’s efforts to employ this strategy. 
8 Our co-editor Benjamin Yost suggested such a strategy. See also Cholbi and Madva (2018) and the PEA Soup blog 
discussion, Kelly et al. (2018). 
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due in significant measure to implicit racial bias. Even if intentional or purposeful discrimination 
plays a minute role in such discrimination, this situation nevertheless cries out for reform. Failure 
to implement reform amounts to a reckless lack of concern for Black Americans’ lives and 
liberties. Yet it is equally clear that mere procedural reforms are grossly insufficient for rooting 
out the systemic racial injustices in the capital punishment regime. Instead, given the evidence 
we have briefly reviewed here, it may very well be that abolishing the death penalty is itself one 




 The death penalty could be abolished in the U.S. de jure, through its legal prohibition, or 
de facto, through states retaining the death penalty in their sentencing statutes but effectively 
suspending its use. We contend that such abolition is the most reasonable reform in light of the 
role that implicit bias plays in generating the racial discrimination at issue. As noted earlier, that 
implicit bias plays a prominent role in generating these discriminatory patterns casts serious 
doubt on whether procedural reforms could ever be adequate to diminish or eliminate these 
patterns.  
Any defensible reform must diminish or eliminate such discrimination. Abolition of capital 
punishment, we propose, is the only reform likely to be both effective and minimally just. Again, 
procedural reforms would likely be ineffective. As we have indicated, the bias at issue intercedes 
at multiple points in the processes that can lead to capital sentences: in investigative practices, in 
prosecutorial decisions, in courtroom behaviors, in jury selection, in sentencing, etc. Law and 
legal institutions can of course be better or worse at filtering out different biases. In this case, 
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however, there are grounds for skepticism that procedural reforms will do much to ferret out the 
bias in question. In addition, any move to tighten the standards for capital sentences will run the 
risk of diminishing the discretion of actors within these institutions, discretion that allows for 
cases to be adjudicated on the basis of specific facts about crimes, defendants’ histories, etc. 
No doubt enthusiasts for capital punishment will view our proposal as morally costly: If the 
death penalty is abolished, then presumably those guilty of the most serious crimes (murder 
predominantly) would be sentenced to the next most severe punishment (in all likelihood, life 
imprisonment without possibility of parole). If death is the only deserved punishment for such 
crimes, then abolition would result in many criminals not getting what they deserve. For some 
defenders of capital punishment, such as Ernest van den Haag, racial discrimination in capital 
charging, trials, sentencing, etc., can never be a sufficiently serious moral cause to outweigh this 
loss. Van den Haag remarks: 
If and when discrimination occurs it should be corrected. Not, however, by letting the guilty blacks escape 
the death penalty because guilty whites do, but by making sure that the guilty white offenders suffer it as 
the guilty blacks do. Discrimination must be abolished by abolishing discrimination - not by abolishing 
penalties. However, even if...this cannot be done, I do not see any good reason to let any guilty murderer 
escape his penalty. It does happen in the administration of criminal justice that one person gets away with 
murder and another is executed. Yet the fact that one gets away with it is no reason to let another one 
escape. (van den Haag and Conrad 1983, p. 223)  
Admittedly, we have not suggested here that death is in principle an unjust penalty for certain 
very severe crimes such as murder. Indeed, we have granted as much for the sake of argument. 
We allow the possibility that a community with a very different racial history than that found in 
the U.S. could implement the death penalty in a non-discriminatory fashion, and on the 
assumption that the death penalty is in principle a just punishment, that would not be a morally 
objectionable outcome. Yet we do not share van den Haag’s insistence that discrimination may 
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only be rightfully addressed by abolishing discrimination without abolishing penalties. That 
racial discrimination in the U.S. capital punishment regime is traceable in part to implicit bias 
suggests that in this instance at least we may be unable to ‘abolish’ discrimination. Moreover, 
even if death is a just punishment for certain severe crimes, that it is uniquely just as a 
punishment for such crimes is a stronger and more dubious claim. There is no obvious basis for 
assuming a one-to-one correspondence between a crime with a specific moral gravity and a 
punishment of proportional severity (that, e.g., only death and not life incarceration without 
parole is a just punishment for murder). We doubt that the geometry of desert is so precise or that 
our judgments about that geometry should be uncritically relied upon. If desert should govern 
how we punish, then certainly it can be unjust not to subject those guilty of egregious crimes to 
severe punishments. But we should not overlook that life imprisonment is itself an extremely 
serious punishment, involving a wide range of physical and mental suffering as well as 
wholesale deprivations of liberty and opportunity. (Indeed, considerations like these lead some in 
the Movement for Black Lives to advocate the abolition of punishment altogether. Addressing 
their broader concerns about the criminal justice system is beyond the scope of this chapter, but 
see Davis 2003 and Yost, this volume.) The gap, then, between the severity of death and the 
severity of life imprisonment is narrower than it appears. Abolition of the death penalty would 
result in the effective commutations of a few thousand prisoners currently on death row to life 
sentences (NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund 2016), as well as resulting in about 40 
additional life sentences (rather than executions) per year (Death Penalty Information Center 
2017). Given the small numbers of offenders involved and the small gap in severity between 
execution and life imprisonment, the moral costs of abolishing capital punishment that vex van 
den Haag are more modest than they appear at first glance. 
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******************************* 
A final consideration in favor of abolition is this: van den Haag (and many others) assume 
that the only reasons we might have to favor abolition out of concern for racial discrimination are 
those flowing from the unjust treatment of Black American defendants or Black American  
murder victims. This overlooks, however, that racial discrimination in capital charging and 
sentencing is not only an injustice to those particular Black Americans that engage with the U.S. 
capital sentencing regime. As the Movement’s platform states, such discrimination also 
represents a political wrong done to Black Americans as a class. 
To see why, return again to the issue of police shootings of Black American suspects. The 
most obvious victims of such wrongful shootings are those injured or killed by police in such 
incidents (as well as their families, friends, communities, etc.). But the pattern of such shootings 
also has moral consequences that extend beyond the shootings themselves. Parents of Black 
American children often feel compelled to have ‘the talk’ with their children, dispensing advice 
about how to engage with police officers so as to prevent themselves being subjected to police 
harassment or violence (Pittman 2017). That parents feel the need to dispense such advice is an 
indication that police shootings establish a different relationship between Black Americans and 
law enforcement than is found between law enforcement and other racial or ethnic groups. For 
Black Americans, that relationship is more materially fraught, posing a greater risk of 
harassment or violence. But that relationship is also morally fraught. For Black Americans have 
good reason to believe that law enforcement does not accord them same respect or status as other 
citizens enjoy. The mistreatment found in police shootings thus extends beyond those Black 
Americans who are criminal suspects or who are directly mistreated by police. Rather, each and 
every Black American, insofar as she can expect a greater probability of such mistreatment 
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should she encounter the police as a suspect, is not accorded the same respect or status as other 
citizens, even if such encounters never in fact occur. The majority of Black Americans will never 
be criminal suspects or have a confrontation with police, yet they know where they stand with 
respect to their treatment by police, namely, that police are more likely not to show the same 
restraint they show toward citizens of other races. 
Police shootings, therefore, alter the moral nature of the relationship between Black 
Americans and law enforcement, to wit, such relationships embody a lack of equal respect or 
ascription of equal status to Black Americans. This is an injustice separate from, and arguably far 
greater in scope, than the injustices done to particular victims of police victims. There is a 
parallel injustice that arises with respect to racial discrimination related to capital crimes. 
Particular Black Americans suffer retributive injustices in the US capital punishment regime 
when they are sentenced to die in part due to their race or when those that murder Black 
Americans avoid the death penalty because of their victims’ Black race. But Black Americans as 
a class also suffer distributive injustice under that regime. More specifically, Black Americans 
do not receive either the equal protection of, or equal status under, the law. They do not enjoy 
equal status under the law because they face an increased likelihood of suffering a greater cost 
than others would due to factors (i.e., race) unrelated to objective desert. A fair system of justice 
would not effectively threaten greater sanctions, all other things being equal, for Black 
Americans who murder than it threatens toward members of other racial groups. This unfairness 
is one to which all Black Americans, not merely Black American murderers murder suspects, 
face. At the same time, Black Americans do not enjoy equal protection of the law under a capital 
sentencing regime that threatens greater sanctions, all other things, for those who murder non-
Black Americans than for those who murder Black Americans. Again, this unfairness is one to 
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which all Black Americans, not merely Black American murder victims or their families, face. 
 On our analysis then, the Black American community is mistreated by the American 
capital punishment regime because that regime makes it the case that two crucial political goods 
the legal system is responsible for ‘distributing’ are unjustly distributed on the basis of race. 
Black American murder defendants are not extended the same legal status as other defendants; 
they are presumed less innocent than defendants of other racial groups. Black American victims 
of murder are not extended the same legal protection as victims of other races; their killers are 
presumed more innocent than those who kill members of other racial groups. The injustices 
wrought by racial bias in American capital sentencing extend beyond the specific retributive 
wrongs done to Black American murder suspects or murder victims. The injustices thus extend 
to the Black American community as a whole, because the capital sentencing regime generates 
normative realities in which Black Americans are not treated as equals (much as the injustice of 
police shootings extends beyond the particular shooting victims to the Black American 
community as a whole). 
That there is an additional distributive injustice at issue here strengthens the case for 
abolition as the most defensible reform in light of racial discrimination in capital cases. Contra 
van den Haag and others, there is an additional “good reason” to abolish the death penalty 
independent of retributive considerations concerning which offenders receive it and which do 
not. That abolition would help to place 39 million Black Americans on more equal footing with 
other Americans as far as the respect and status the criminal justice system accords them is a 
powerful reason in its favor. Only abolition, we contend, would do this, and would come at a 
moral cost (foregoing executions) that appears modest in comparison.  
******************************* 
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 Much of American jurisprudence, and academic argumentation surrounding race and 
capital punishment, have therefore been mistaken about the sources of racial discrimination  
in the American capital punishment regime. That implicit racial bias, instead of overt acts of 
discrimination, is a key source of such discrimination implies that abolition is likely to be the 
only adequate remedy for such discrimination. The Movement for Black Lives’ call for death 
penalty abolition because it wrongs Black American communities highlights how the best 
rationale for abolition has also not been appreciated. That such discrimination constitutes a 
wrong not simply to Black Americans who engage with the capital punishment regime either as 
defendants or as murder victims but also to Black Americans as a class insofar as they not 
accorded equal respect under, or the equal status of, the law, implies that abolition is a remedy 
for a wrong of noticeably greater magnitude than extant discussions of such matters have 
recognized. Together, these two factors ground a stronger case for the abolition of capital 
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